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Finders Keepers? The Titanic and the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention
By CYNTHIA FURRER NEWTON
Member of the Class of 1987
I cannot believe my eyes.... I have never seen the ship--nor has
anyone for 73 years.... She is the U.S.S. Titanic, the luxury liner lost
after collision with an iceberg in 1912.1
Several modem cases have applied the rule of "find" with its con-
comitant dogma of "finders keepers" to instances of long lost and
abandoned wrecks.2
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Titanic sank few believed it would ever be found.' Tech-
nological advances, however, have enabled searchers to find the Titanic
seventy-three years later.4 Technology such as that which made discov-
ery5 of the Titanic possible has provided the means for discovery of other
sunken vessels and treasure.6 This technology now allows private entre-
1. Ballard & Michel, How We Found Titanic, 168 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 696 (1985) (ex-
clamation of Robert D. Ballard).
2. 3a Benedict on Admiralty (MB) § 158 (7th ed. 1983).
3. Britain's White Star Line reportedly paid a total of $663,000 of the $16 million in
property loss claims. Ballard & Michel, supra note 1, at 718; see also W. HOFFMAN & J.
GRIMM, BEYOND REACH: THE SEARCH FOR THE TITANIc (1982).
4. The luxury liner, believed to be unsinkable, sank on April 14, 1912, when she hit an
iceberg during her maiden voyage from England. Angier, After 73 Years, a Titanic Find, TIME,
Sept. 16, 1985, at 68.
5. The French and Americans worked together on the discovery. Le Suroit, a French
research ship, crossed 80% of the 150-square mile target zone using its revolutionary deep
search sonar vehicle named "SAR," which could survey a strip of ocean floor more than a
half-mile wide at each pass. Le Suroit began this intensive search in June 1985. Sometime
later, the Knorr, an American research vessel based at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution,
lowered its search vehicle, Argo, to search. Argo supports video cameras, side-scan sonar, a
computerized timing system, and other electronic gear. On September 1, 1985, Argo sent back
video images of the Titanic's boilers. Ballard & Michel, supra note 1, at 704-07; see also An-
gier, supra note 4, at 69.
6. In 1981 Peter Gimbel dove to the Andrea Doria, which had sunk in June 1956 in
Scandinavian waters. W. HOFFMAN & J. GRIMM, supra note 3, at 131-33. The Hamilton and
Scourge, old vessels from the War of 1812, were found in Lake Ontario in 1975. Nelson, Ghost
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preneurs, scientific research teams, and state-supported searchers access
to nearly all parts of the ocean floor and the array of ships and treasure
"lost" there. The question of who owns these treasures therefore has
become more relevant.
The Titanic was discovered in September 1985.' Reactions to the
discovery and opinions regarding the ship's ownership and proper dispo-
sal varied.8 The chief scientist in the expedition which found the Titanic,
Robert Ballard, plans only to observe the ship from a manned research
submarine.9 He believes that the ship should be left on the seabed as a
memorial to those who died. 10 Jack Grimm, who claims to have discov-
ered the ship in 1981, wants to recover some of the valuables."1 John
Pierce, who led a team which retrieved goods from the Lusitania, re-
cently won a case allowing him to attempt to raise that ship.12 Pierce
believes those who discovered the Titanic have no special claim to it. 3
The exact position of the Titanic has not been released. Because of
the differences in opinion regarding the proper disposal or treatment of
the Titanic, Ballard would only describe the ship's location as approxi-
mately 500 miles off the coast of Newfoundland, Canada, and 13,000 feet
under the sea. 14
Ships of the War of 1812, 163 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 289, 306 (1983). In the 1970s Melvin
Fisher found the Nuestra Seffora de Atocha off the Marquesas Keys near Florida. The treasure
includes silver ingots, a cannon, and gold coins valued at $400 million. Brower, Mild Man-
nered Mel Fisher Defies the Deep to Retrieve a King's Ransom in Lost Treasure, PEOPLE MAG-
AZINE, Aug. 12, 1985, at 63.
7. N. Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1985, at 8, col. 1. The discovery was made by the crew of the
Knorr, although the Titanic had first been located a month earlier by the French survey ship
Le Suroit. The first photographs of the ship were taken by the Knorr's search vehicles. See
supra note 3.
8. USA Today, Sept. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
9. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1985, at 8, col. 1.
10. Angier, supra note 4, at 70. See Ballard & Michel, supra note 1. In addition, Eva
Hart, a survivor of the Titanic, believes, like most of the survivors, that the Titanic should be
left submerged as a memorial. Ballard and Michel, supra note 1, at 718. Reps. Jones, Lent,
Biaggi, Studds, Lowery, Carpenter, and Hughes introduced H.R. 3272, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985), to designate the shipwreck of the Titanic as a maritime memorial and to provide for
reasonable research, exploration, and, if appropriate, salvage activities. 131 CONG. REC.
H7408 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1985). The bill was passed under suspension of rules by a two-thirds
vote on December 2, 1985. 131 CONG. REc. (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1985). The representatives who
introduced the bill may not have been using the term "salvage" in its legal sense. See infra
notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
11. For an account of Grimm's search for this ship, see W. HOFFMAN & J. GRIMM, supra
note 3.
12. Peirce and Another v. Bemis and Others, the Lusitania, 1 Q.B. 401 (1986). San Fran-
cisco Chron., Nov. 30, 1985, at 4, col. 5.
13. Id.
14. Angier, supra note 4, at 68.
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The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention)15
will at least serve as a guide, and may determine ownership rights to the
Titanic.1 6 The LOS Convention is the first multilateral treaty containing
provisions directly applicable to the disposal of, protection of, and rights
15. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in K. SiMMONDS, U.N. CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA 1982 B1 (1983)[hereinafter LOS Convention]. Simmonds' reprint includes
the Final Act and a good description of the numerous documents generated. Id. at ix-x.
16. The United States Constitution sets forth three sources of the supreme law of the land:
the Constitution itself, legislation enacted by Congress in accordance with the Constitution,
and all treaties constitutionally entered into by the United States. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Article 6 provides:
This constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrarty notwithstanding.
It would appear to be self-evident that all treaties to which the United States is a party are an
integral part of United States law under article 6. The United States has not, however, ratified
the LOS Convention, and thus the LOS Convention cannot qualify as the supreme law of the
land as a treaty made under the authority of the United States.
In terms of legislation enacted by Congress, Congress has the power to alter, qualify, or
supplement the traditional admiralty law. Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924). It
has done so through the Judiciary Act of 1948 which provides in relevant part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the states of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases
all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1948).
Regardless of forum, however, the prevailing rule under the savings to suitors clause is
that federal substantive law applies. Baptiste v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 106
Cal. App. 3d 87 (2d Dist. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981). Although the statute
provides that suitors may pursue their remedies in the state courts, the state courts are bound
to apply federal law in such disputes in order to secure a single and uniform body of maritime
law. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Dow Chemical Co., 25 N.Y.2d 576 (1970) cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970). In other words, there is no body of state maritime law. A state
court hearing a maritime cause of action under the saving to suitors clause may apply its own
procedural law, however. Maxwell v. Olsen, 468 P.2d 48 (Alaska 1980).
What is federal substantive maritime law? Although the Constitution is silent as to the
role of customary international law in the United States legal system, the United States
Supreme Court has held that:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
court of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is
no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). In other words, federal substantive maritime law is
customary international law in the absence of a treaty in force or an act of Congress. See
generally U.S. Department of Justice Legal Education Institute, International Law for Attor-
neys in Domestic Program Agencies 35-41 (Rev. ed. 1985).
Because the United States has not ratified the LOS Convention, its courts would not apply
the Convention per se. United States courts would, however, apply the LOS Convention to the
19861
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to sunken ships and treasure.17 The Titanic and its valuables fall within
the Convention's provisions pertaining to objects of an historical and
archeological nature (OHANs). Although the LOS Convention is not
extent it codifies customary international law. The extent to which articles 149 and 303 codify
the customary international law of salvage and finds is the focus of this Note.
Finally, it is possible that the LOS Convention could be applied beyond the extent to
which it codifies customary international law simply by virtue of its progressive nature.
Drafted over several years by multinational committees, the LOS Convention is a strong indi-
cation of emerging customary international law which is, by definition, developmental in na-
ture. See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 36-40 and
accompanying text.
This choice of law question is distinct from the jurisdictional question, which is outside
the scope of this Note. See infra note 23.
17. Four treaties on the law of the sea were the foundation for the LOS Convention:
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. 578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on Fishing and Conservation
of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. 5969, 559
U.N.T.S. 285. For a good discussion of the application of these conventions to archeological
objects, see Note, Archaeological and Historical Objects: The International Legal Implications
of UNCLOS 111, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 777 (1982). Each of these conventions states that it is
generally declaratory of established principles of customary international law and is considered
as such. T. SCHOENBAUM & A. YIANNOPOULOS, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 19
(1984). The United States incorporation of these conventions into its law is evidence of their
acceptance as customary international law. For example, the United States incorporated the
Convention on the Continental Shelf eleven years after the passage of the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act. Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
56 (1982). The Convention has been held to supersede any incompatible terms in the domestic
statute. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569
F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16, 21 (5th Cir. 1970). The United
States also incorporated into domestic law the baseline provisions of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15
(1982); United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 165 (1965); United States v. Louisiana, 394
U.S. 11, 16, 34 (1969).
The only treaty of the four which arguably applies to objects of archeological and histori-
cal nature (OHANs) such as the Titanic is the Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra,
under the theory that long-sunken ships are natural resources. Article 2(1) states, "The
coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it
and exploiting its natural resources." Id. art. 2(1). But, the International Law Commission, in
interpreting the article, has excluded sunken ships from the definition of "natural resource,"
holding that "[i]t is clearly understood that the rights in question do not cover objects such as
wrecked ships and their cargoes (including bullion) lying on the seabed or covered by the sand
of the subsoil." 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 42, U.N. Doe. A/3159 (1956). Thus,
although it could have, the Convention on the Continental Shelf does not apply to OHANs
such as the Titanic. In addition, the LOS Convention specifically supersedes this treaty saying:
"This Convention shall prevail, as between States Parties, over the Geneva Conventions on the
Law of the Sea of 1958." LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 311(1). The only other multi-
lateral treaty preceding the LOS Convention was the 1910 Assistance and Salvation Conven-
tion, Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658, T.S. No. 76, 1913 G.B.T.S. No. 4 (entered into force Mar. 1,
1913), which contains no specific provision regarding OHANs.
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yet in force,"8 its provisions have an influence on international law.19
This Note will discuss the law of salvage and the law of finds, which
applied to OHANs before the LOS Convention. The Note will then fo-
cus on article 14920 and article 30321 of the LOS Convention, which ap-
ply directly to the Titanic and other OHANs.22 The language of articles
149 and 303 will be interpreted, aided by a historical survey of the Con-
vention's drafting process and by a comparison with the terms of other
articles of the Convention.
18. Thirty-two of the necessary 60 states have ratified the LOS Convention. LOS Conven-
tion, supra note 15, art. 308(1); see K. SIMMONDS, 2 NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE
SEA, ch. V3, at 1 (1986); see infra note 82.
19. See infra notes 95-113 and accompanying text.
20. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 149.
21. Id. art. 303.
22. Other articles of the LOS Convention arguably apply to the Titanic and other sunken
treasure. These include Part V, articles 55-75, entitled "The Exclusive Economic Zone," and
article 143, entitled "Marine Scientific Research." See id. These articles will not be discussed
in this Note. Article 56 would not be applicable if the Titanic were considered a natural
resource. See supra note 17. Article 56(1) might be used, however, to assert a claim based on
the exclusive right to explore and exploit this region. Article 143 is the provision most likely
to be seen as applicable because marine scientific research is heavily funded by states and
private groups that hope to benefit from the projects, and the Titanic was found by a research
vessel sponsored by scientific research teams from the United States and France. See supra
note 5. In addition, the early stages of exploration of the seabed for historic artifacts likely will
be carried out largely by these same research teams, because they are equipped with the funds
and equipment to reach the seafloor. Because the drafters created provisions specifically dis-
cussing OHANs, however, it is unlikely that a claim based on articles 56 and 143 would be
recognized. Articles 6 and 143 are reprinted below in pertinent part, for the reader's informa-
tion.
Article 56 states:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters super-
adjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the pro-
duction of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention
with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in
the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and
duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this
Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-bed and subsoil shall
be exercised in accordance with Part VI.
LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 56.
Article 143 states in pertinent part:
1986]
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Next, the potential effect of articles 149 and 303 on ownership rights
to OHANs will be analyzed.23 This Note compares and contrasts the
Convention provisions with the law of salvage and the law of finds. In
addition, the Note examines the outcome of the Titanic controversy
under both the LOS Convention and the laws of salvage and finds. Fi-
nally, suggestions to help remedy inadequacies of the Convention are
provided so that an effective, consistent international approach to owner-
ship disputes over OHANs can be developed and implemented.
II. HISTORICAL FOUNDATION FOR THE LOS
CONVENTION
A. Mare Liberum and Mare Clausum
Two important doctrines governing the law of the sea preceded the
development of the customary international law of salvage and the law of
finds. The first of these was mare liberum.24 Mare liberum ("free seas")
proposed that the seas are free in the sense that all persons are free to
navigate upon them.25
The second and contrasting doctrine of the sea is mare clausum 26
("closed seas"). Mare clausum proposes that there is nothing in natural
3. States Parties may carry out marine scientific research in the Area. States
Parties shall promote international co-operation in marine scientific research in the
Area by:
(a) participating in international programmes and encouraging co-operation in
marine scientific research by personnel of different countries and of the Authority;
(b) ensuring that programmes are developed through the Authority or other
international organizations as appropriate for the benefit of developing States and
technologically less developed States with a view to:
(i) strengthening their research capabilities;
(ii) training their personnel and the personnel of the Authority in the tech-
niques and applications of research;
(iii) fostering the employment of their qualified personnel in research in the
Area;
(c) effectively disseminating the results of research and analysis when available,
through the Authority or other international channels when appropriate.
Id. art. 143.
23. The outcome of any decision on these long-sunken ships will be affected, of course, by
jurisdictional issues. The exact location, for example, of the Titanic, will affect the tribunal in
which any determination of rights to the ship and its effects would be heard. This question of
jurisdiction is outside the scope of this Note. For a discussion of jurisdiction under United
States law, see Owen, Some Legal Troubles With Treasure: Jurisdiction and Salvage, 16 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 139 (1985).
24. T. SCHOENBAUM & A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 17, at 9-10.
25. Id. at 10.
26. Id.
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law to preclude territorial occupation of the sea.2 7 Rights of passage and
other rights granted to countries are simply privileges granted by those
who control that geographic region of the sea.28
John Selden,29 a lawyer and scholar, advocated the doctrine of mare
clausum, and further asserted that there was nothing in international law
to preclude territorial occupation of the sea, including the establishment
of sea frontiers30 using parallels and meridians.31 Historically, British
sovereigns used Selden's ideas to protect fishing rights32 until eventually
mare liberum became established, for a time, as customary international
law.33 Britain reluctantly accepted mare liberum, but only because the
doctrine allowed the British to assert jurisdiction over activities such as
piracy without claiming dominion or sovereignty over the waters where
those acts occurred.34 In this sense, the doctrine of free seas benefits only
those with the power to assert their rights to the seas.35
B. Customary International Law: The Law of Salvage and the Law
of Finds
1. Customary International Law
The law of salvage and the law of finds developed from the ancient doc-
trines of mare liberum and mare clausum and from British maritime
law.36 Because the British frequently adjudicated issues related to ship-
ping on the high seas, and because maritime law is intrinsically interna-
tional, the current law of salvage and law of finds developed primarily in
the British courts.37 This foundation gave the law of salvage and the law
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Selden was a seventeenth century legal scholar who advocated the theory of mare
clausum. Id.
30. Selden used the term "sea frontiers" in the sense of an international border and the
region beyond it. Id.
31. In geography, the term "parallel" refers to the imaginary lines representing degrees of
latitude encircling the earth parallel to the equator. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 900
(2d College ed. 1982). Likewise, a meridian is the line made by encircling the earth's surface
while passing through both geophysical poles. Id. at 787.
32. T. SCHOENBAUM & A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 17, at 10. James I (1603-1625) and
Charles I (1625-1649) asserted the doctrine to protect the rich fishing grounds off the coast of
the British Isles from foreign fleets. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Christy, Property Rights in the World Ocean, 15 NAT. REsOURCES J. 695, 696, 704
(1975).
36. See T. SCHOENBAUM & A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 17, at 10.
37. For decades now, these theories have been applied in the courts of the United States,
which like Britain, is a great shipping power. Id.
19861
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of finds their international character and authority. Through repeated
application, the law of salvage and the law of finds became customary
international law.38 This customary international law served as the foun-
dation for the LOS Convention.
Customary international law is one possible source of law for set-
tling international disputes. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
often uses customary international law to reach its decisions.3 9 Because
the LOS Convention is the first treaty with provisions specifically dealing
with OHANs, 4 the law of salvage and the law of finds would control the
disposition of OHANs if the LOS Convention is not recognized or in
effect between the parties to the dispute.
2. The Law of Salvage
A court may apply the law of salvage to property that meets several
requirements, which have remained unchanged for decades. They are: 1)
marine peril;4" 2) salvage service voluntarily rendered when not required
38. For a discussion of the unique international nature of maritime law and the conse-
quence that traditional bodies of maritime law have the quality of customary international law,
see id. at 1-10.
39. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1978 I.C.J. Acts &
Docs. 77, states:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
Of course, when a treaty codifies customary international law, the court need not decide
between the bodies of law given in subsections 1(a) and 1(b) above. The structure of article 38
implies that treaty and custom can be different sources leading to different international law,
but obscures the fact that these two principle sources interrelate. Gamble, The Treaty/Custom
Dichotomy: An Overview, 16 TEx. INT'L L.J. 305, 307 (1981).
40. See supra note 17.
41. In order to be in "marine peril," the property must be in danger, either presently or
reasonably apprehended. Plymouth Rock, 9 F. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1881); Fort Meyers Shell
& Dredging Co. v. Barge NBC 512, 404 F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1968). Actual loss and subjec-
tion to the elements constitutes marine peril for the purpose of making a valid salvage claim.
Platoro Ltd. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 518 F. Supp. 816, 821 (W.D. Tex. 1981),
aff'd, 695 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983). The Platoro court held
that an argument that the vessel was safely embedded and preserved in a 10 to 15 foot layer of
sand was not persuasive because Platoro had no way of knowing how well preserved the cargo
would be. Id. at 821. Another court recently stated that the "argument that no marine peril
[Vol. 10
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as an existing duty or from a special contract; 3) successful salvage in
whole or in part, or the salvage service contributing to the success. 42
3. The Law of Finds
The elements required for application of the law of finds are also
well-established.43 First, the law of finds applies only when property has
been abandoned.' Competing searchers are entitled to enter the area
where the abandoned property is located and to seek to reduce it to their
possession as long as they act without infringing on the rights of other
searchers. Second, rights are "transferred" to the first person who
reduces the property to possession.45
4. The Differences Between the Law of Salvage and the Law of
Finds
The difference between the application of the law of salvage and the
law of finds is "highly material. '46 The law of finds applies only if the
property was abandoned; salvage law, on the other hand, applies only if
existed ignores the reality of the situation." Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked
and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1978)(Treasure Salvors, Inc. is
granted limited title to the Nvestra Setfora de Atocha; the Fifth Circuit does not decide whether
Treasure Salvors' title is exclusive of all other claimants)[hereinafter Treasure Salvors 1].
"Marine peril includes more than the threat of storm, fire or piracy to a vessel in naviga-
tion.... There is no dispute that the Atocha was lost. Even after discovery of the vessel's
location it is still in peril of being lost through the actions of elements." Id. Another court
held that the ship and cargo were not in marine peril and declined to follow the Fifth Circuit
rule that an abandoned ship wreck constitutes marine peril for the purpose of stating a valid
salvage claim. Subacquaeous Exploration and Archaeology, Ltd. v. Unidentified, Wrecked
and Abandoned Vessel, 577 F. Supp. 597, 611 (D. Md. 1983).
42. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 534-35 (1975); see Sabine, 101
U.S. 384 (1879); Platoro, 518 F. Supp. at 820; Cobb Coin Co. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549 F. Supp. 540, 557 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Legnos v. M/V Olga Jacob,
498 F.2d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1974). A discussion of the substantive area of salvage law called
"contract salvage" is outside the scope of this Note.
43. See Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 354, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Hener in-
volved a dispute among several groups of divers over the right to salvage any remaining silver
from the cargo of a barge which sank in 1903 off Staten Island. Dredging and diving recovered
85% of the cargo before operations stopped in October 1903. Three groups of amateur divers
sought to enjoin the United States Coast Guard from enforcing a safety zone which prevented
them from diving for the silver. The court held that the silver was abandoned, but the court
also determined that none of the diver groups had asserted enough possession over it to have
vested title. For an analysis of Hener, the law of salvage, and the law of finds, see generally
Note, Treasure Salvage: Admiralty Court "Finds" Old Law, 28 Loy. L. REv. 1126 (1982).
44. Hener, 525 F. Supp. at 354.
45. Id. A mere searcher has no property right if he succeeds in finding the property, but
does not assert possession. Id.
46. Id. at 355. The distinction is important not only because the application of one or the
other doctrine is outcome- determinative, but also because each body of law fosters different
1986]
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the title to that property remained in its prior owner.47 If the law of finds
is applied, the court distributes the property to the finders; if salvage law
is applied, the court turns the property over to the owner and goes on to
to determine the appropriate salvage fees to award the salvor.48
The law of salvage and the law of finds are based on differing goals,
assumptions, and rules. Salvage law aims to save property and to com-
pensate those who save it.49 Salvage law assumes that the property being
salved is owned by another and has not been abandoned.50 It also as-
sumes that property lost at sea has been taken involuntarily. 1
Salvage law rules promote its goals. Property may not be salvaged
unless it is in some peril. 2 Any assertion that title to property has been
lost requires strong proof, such as express abandonment. 3 A salvor may
rebut the presumption of abandoned title. Courts allow a salvor the su-
perior right of possession, but not title, until a court has passed on title
and the salvage fee. 4 A salvor must have the intent and the capacity to
save property, and must have actually saved it.5 The salvor must intend
to save, but not necessarily to own the property. 6 To recover the award,
possession need only be to the extent necessary to perform the salvage
service and to justify a reward. 7 In addition, if the salvor does not re-
trieve the property by him or herself, but instead helps another salvor,
the salvor will be rewarded proportionately to the extent of his or her
aid.58
In contrast to the law of salvage, the aims of the law of finds center
on determining title to ownerless property. 9 The law of finds assumes
that the finder has title against all the world, unless the original owner
can rebut the presumption.60
The law of finds promotes these goals. It requires a high degree of
policies and requires different action on the part of the claimants. Id. at 355-56; see infra text
accompanying notes 46-66.
47. Hener, 535 F. Supp. at 355.
48. Id. at 353.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 356-57.
52. For definition of marine peril, see supra note 41.






59. Id. at 356.
60. Id.
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control over the property to establish title because the finder must estab-
lish intent in addition to possession. 1 Under the law of finds, property
cannot be shared; a mere contribution to the effort to assert possession is
not compensated.62
The rules of salvage law and the rules of finds law create different
incentives. The rules of salvage markedly diminish the incentive for sal-
vors to work secretly, hide recoveries, and ward off competition from
other would-be salvors.6" Salvage rules enable courts to encourage open,
lawful, and cooperative conduct, based on the salvage law goal of pre-
serving property.64
The rules of the law of finds encourage groups to act avariciously.
65
Because neither the effort nor the acquisition of property alone is enough,
would-be finders are encouraged to act secretively, hide recoveries, and
deprive other would-be finders of property. 6
5. Treasure Salvage
Commentators, writing long before the LOS Convention negotia-
tions began, believed the law of finds should apply in maritime cases of
long-lost wrecks, publicly abandoned property, or things found on seas
or rivers that were never the property of any person.67 Indeed, the law of
finds applies to long-lost wrecks because usually these wrecks are either
expressly abandoned by their owners or adjudicated abandoned later.68
In the United States today, attempts to discover or retrieve OHANs are
often referred to as "treasure salvage."'69 Those who find OHANs can
bring an in rem action under the law of salvage because courts assume
the OHAN no longer has an owner.70 The plaintiff asserts that he or she
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 358.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 356.
66. Id.
67. 3A Benedict on Admiralty (MB) § 158 (7th ed. 1983).
68. Florida v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 621 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir. 1980)(Florida had no claim
to the artifacts under the contract law theory of mutual mistake, but the Fifth Circuit declined
to decide whether Florida was bound under Treasure Salvors 1)[hereinafter Treasure Salvors
I1]; see Treasure Salvors I, supra note 41.
69. Owen, supra note 23, at 140.
70. Metropolitan Dade County v. One Bronze Cannon, 537 F. Supp. 923, 926 (S.D. Fla.
1982) (citing Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
640 F.2d 560, 66 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981) (district court did not abuse its discretion by granting an
injunction prohibiting salvors other than Treasure Salvors, Inc. from conducting salvage oper-
ations near abandoned vessel; case remanded to district court for modification of the injunc-
tion)[hereinafter Treasure Salvors 111]).
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has salvaged the property, that he or she deserves a salvage award, and
that the award should be the OHAN itself. In such cases the "salvor"
actually obtains the same result as would a finder under the law of finds:
possession of the OHAN. Several plaintiffs have recently proceeded on
this theory because the original owners of the property were unknown,
and several of these plaintiffs have been successful.7" Because the plain-
tiff's claim is technically a salvage claim, he or she must establish that
the OHAN is in marine peril before receiving an award.72 Other than
this requirement and procedural differences, the result of these "salvage"
actions is "finders keepers."
Others have successfully proceeded under a pure law of finds theory
with an action for possession and confirmation of title, asserting the ves-
sel was abandoned and that he or she had become the owner as finder in
possession. 73 One such case, known as "Treasure Salvors II,''74 involved
a claim to bullion aboard the sunken Nuestra Seffora de Atocha. After
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the property was
abandoned, it applied the law of finds.75 It held that the finder had as-
serted adequate possession and that it held title to the bullion.7 6
The ownership rights to the Titanic may be determined under either
of these theories. The plaintiff might bring an in rem action under the
law of salvage and seek to have the ship itself be designated the salvage
award. For the plaintiff to succeed, a court would have to determine that
the Titanic was in peril. Alternatively, if the plaintiff brought an action
under the law of finds, asserting that he or she had become the owner, a
court would have to determine that the Titanic was abandoned. Under
either theory, ownership rights to the Titanic would be determined under
the prevailing concept of finders keepers.77
71. Owen, supra note 23, at 150-51. Klein v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Ves-
sel, 568 F. Supp. 1562 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (plaintiff unsuccessful); Platoro Ltd. v. Unidentified
Remains of a Vessel, 518 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Tex. 1981), aff'd, 695 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983) (plaintiff successful); Cobb Coin Co. v. Unidentified, Wrecked
and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (plaintiff successful).
72. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text; see also Owen, supra note 23, at 171-75.
73. This result has been noted with approval in subsequent cases. See Rickard v. Pringle,
293 F. Supp. 981 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186
F. Supp. 452 (E.D. Va. 1960).
74. Treasure Salvors III, supra note 70, at 560.
75. Id. at 568-70.
76. Id.
77. This conclusion is also reached by T. SCHOENBAUM & A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note
17, at 507.
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6. The Law of Finds and Mare Liberum
Mare liberum and the law of finds are similar in their philosophies
and effects. Mare liberum proposes that the sea is free and open to all
and that all states have access to it in its entirety.78 The problem with
this philosophy is that only those states with power and ability truly have
access to the entire sea. The law of finds is based on the same philoso-
phy: those who can assert possession over abandoned property can gain
title to it.
7 9
I. THE LOS CONVENTION
Although the LOS Convention was signed in December 1982 by 117
states,80 it is not yet in force. It was to remain open for ratification for
twenty-four months after the opening date and to enter into force be-
tween ratifying states twelve months after deposit of the sixtieth ratifica-
tion or instrument of accession. 81 Thirty-two states and other entities
had ratified the Convention as of January 1987.82
The LOS Convention is the result of over fifteen years of negotia-
tions and work by over 130 nations. Meetings and discussions regarding
the Convention began in 1967,83 and the first formal session was held at
the United Nations Headquarters in 1973. 84 Fifteen years of work on the
Convention produced a comprehensive document. Its 320 articles and
nine annexes address issues affecting nearly every nation.85 Most signifi-
cantly here, the Convention was the first treaty to include provisions spe-
cifically applicable to OHANs. 6
Many official documents arose out of the years of discussion and
78. See supra notes 24-35 and acompanying text.
79. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. This is also true for the in rem salvage
action.
80. McDorman, The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: The First Year, 15 J. MAR. L. &
CoM. 211, 211 (1984). One hundred seventeen nations signed, 22 attended but did not sign,
and 24 nations did not attend the Convention.
81. LOS Convention, supra note 15, arts. 305(2), 308(1).
82. This is an increase from 1984 when only nine countries had ratified the Convention.
83. The first committee was established by G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 14, U.N. Doe. A/6716 (1967).
84. McDorman, supra note 80, at 230.
85. The articles address the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, id. arts. 55-75, the conti-
nental shelf, id. arts. 76-85, the development of resources of the Area, including seabed and
mining rights, id. arts. 150-55, navigation through straits, id. arts. 34-45, and many other
topics.
86. See supra note 17.
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negotiation. 87 These records summarize states' representatives' com-
ments and some committee reports. The official documents show that
representatives only briefly discussed OHANs; the representatives were
more concern with seabed mining, reservations,88 marine scientific re-
search, pollution, and the definition of the continental shelf. Likewise,
commentators have written about LOS Convention provisions pertaining
to the Exclusive Economic Zone,89 seabed mining rights,9" marine pollu-
tion,9' marine scientific research,92 and the settlement of disputes.93 Ar-
ticles 149 and 303, which specifically address OHANs, have sparked
little controversy or comment, however.
94
87. The Official Documents of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea are
cited herein as UNCLOS III OR.
88. A reservation has been defined as a "unilateral statement, however phrased or named,
made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby
it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their
application to that State." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(d), May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). See McDorman, Reser-
vations and the Law of the Sea Treaty, 13 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 481 (1982); Hazou, Determining
the Extent of Admissibility of Reservations: Some Considerations With Regard to the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 69 (1980).
89. Note, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Its Development and Future in International
Domestic Law, 45 LA. L. REv. 1269 (1985).
90. The provisions regarding seabed mining have generated much comment. See Brewer,
The Prospect for Deep Seabed Mining in a Divided World, 14 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 363
(1985); Collins, Mineral Exploitation of the Seabed: Problems, Progress, and Alternatives, 12
NAT. RESOURCES L. 599 (1979), Evriviades, The Third World's Approach to the Deep Seabed,
11 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 201 (1982); Luoma, A Comparative Study of National Legislation
Concerning the Deep Sea Mining of Manganese Nodules, 14 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 243 (1983);
Newlin, An Alternative Legal Mechanism for Deep Sea Mining, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 257 (1980);
Note, The Composite Text & Nodule Mining: Over-Regulation as A Threat to the "Common
Heritage of Mankind," 1 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 167 (1977); Richardson, Law in
the Making: A Universal Regime for Deep Seabed Mining? 53 N.Y. ST. B. J. 408 (1981); Rich-
ardson, The United States and the Current Status of Deep Seabed Mining at the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 11 ENVTL. L. 193 (1981).
91. Bernhardt, A Schematic Analysis of Vessel-Source Pollution: Prescriptive Enforcement
Regimes in the Law of the Sea Conference, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 265 (1980); Pruitt, Unilateral
Deep Seabed Mining and Environmental Standards: A Risky Venture, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
345 (1982); Ramakrishna, Environmental Concerns and the New Law of the Sea, 16 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 1 (1985).
92. Jacobson, Marine Scientific Research Under Emerging Ocean Law, 9 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 187 (1981); Knauss, The Effects of the Law of the Sea on Future Marine Scientific
Research and of Marine Scientific Research on the Future Law of the Sea, 45 LA. L. REv. 1201
(1985); Vorbach, The Law of the Sea Regime and Ocean Law Enforcement New Challenges for
Technology, 9 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 323 (1981).
93. See generally McDorman, supra note 80, at 229; see also Adede, The Basic Structure
of the Disputes Settlement Part of the Law of the Sea Convention, 11 OCEAN DEy. & INT'L L.
125 (1982); Comment, Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the Draft Convention on the Law of
the Sea, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 331 (1981).
94. Note, supra note 17, at 777.
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A. The LOS Convention's Influence
Even if the LOS Convention has not codified customary interna-
tional law,95 it may have binding power. Although not legally in force,
the LOS Convention has influence as a complex and long-negotiated in-
ternational document96 affecting states' rights, because international law
imposes obligations on signatories of treaties before those treaties are
ratified.
97
First, the World Court and the ICJ have relied on treaties not in
force in their decisions. For example, the ICJ has given force to signato-
ries' reservations, but refused to give force to non-signatories' reserva-
tions when a treaty was signed.98 In an earlier case, the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) gave provisional status to a treaty
between signatories when the treaty was later ratified, although it was
not legally in force when the dispute arose.99
Second, state action may bind signatories of treaties not in force.
States may bind themselves by including a provision in the treaty it-
self."°° The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and the Agreed
Statement and Common Understandings appended to SALT II are re-
garded as binding in and of themselves, despite the fact that they are
unratified, because they contain a provision which explicitly binds
states.101 The LOS Convention lacks such a provision, but in the opinion
of several commentators, carries force nevertheless, on other bases.
For instance, states may bind themselves by issuing statements
showing an intent to follow a treaty before its ratification.102 Thus, the
LOS Convention may be binding on states which have publicly expressed
an intent to be bound by it. For example, before the LOS Convention was
signed, a United States representative stated his signature reflected an
95. See infra notes 203-215 and accompanying text. For a good analysis of whether the
LOS Convention codifies customary international law, see Lee, The Law of the Sea Convention
and Third States, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 542 (1983).
96. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
97. Rogoff, The International Legal Obligations of Signatories to an Unratified Treaty, 32
ME. L. REv. 263, 271-72 (1980).
98. Id. at 275 (citing the Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15).
99. Id. (citing Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 2, reprinted in I WORLD COURT REPORTS 293, 297 (M. Hudson ed. 1934)).
100. Id. at 280 & n.56.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 281-82 n.57. For example, Henry Kissinger made an implied concession to
comply with international control and regulation of deep seabed mining and the 200-mile Ex-
clusive Economic Zone. Larson, The Reagan Rejection of the U.N. Convention, 14 OCEAN
DEv. INT'L L. 337, 340 (1985).
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obligation to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of the Convention. 103 Furthermore, the United States has accepted the
twelve-mile territorial sea described in article 3.14 The United States has
also expressed an intent to exercise its navigational rights consistent with
the LOS Convention. 0 5
Third, article 18 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties' 016 provides
that treaties not in force can be binding in nature. The nature of this
obligation, however, is debated.'0 7 Some states believe they are bound
morally and others believe they are bound legally. '0 8 Whatever the na-
ture of the obligation, it is clear that signatories to a treaty not in force
are bound to some extent by signing.'0 9
Finally, some commentators believe that the LOS Convention is
binding based on international politics." 0 One representative to the
Convention stated, " I would swallow a little principle in the interest of
103. Rogoff, supra note 97, at 282 n.57 (citing Letter from Elliot Richardson to Gerry
Studds (June 15, 1979), reprinted in Law of the Sea: Hearings on H.R. 2759 Before the Sub-
comm. on Oceanography of the Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
206 (1979)). The statement refers to LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 3.
104. Statement by the Legal Advisor of the United States Department of State, 66 AM. .
INT'L L. 133, 133 (1972). The statement refers to LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 3.
105. United States Proclamation on an Exclusive Economic Zone, 22 I.L.M. 461 (1983).
President Reagan also warned states not to deprive the United States of navigational rights
because of its failure to sign the LOS Convention. See McDorman, supra note 80, at 223.
Arguably the Proclamation recognizes the establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone as
emerging and binding customary international law. The LOS Convention itself defines "States
Parties" as those which have "consented to be bound" by it. LOS Convention, supra note 15,
art. 1(2)(1). States which fail to sign a treaty yet claim they are entitled to claim and enjoy
certain provisions of the treaty are sometimes called "Third States." Lee, supra note 95, at
541-42. For a good discussion of these states' obligations and claims, see id. Lee points out
that articles 149 and 303 use the term "States," not "States Parties." Id. at 50.
106. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides in article 18:
A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constitut-
ing the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval, until it shall have made
its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its
consent to be bound be the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and
provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). Four years have lapsed since the LOS
Convention was opened for signature. While some may argue this endangers the binding effect
of the Convention, most others would agree that four years in the international scheme is not
long enough to invalidate over 15 years of work. See infra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
107. Rogoff, supra note 97, at 283-88.
108. Id. at 285-88. Rogoff believes that the nature of the obligation not to defeat the object
or purpose of a treaty before signature is legal. Id. at 289.
109. Id. at 285-89.
110. Ratiner, Where do We Go From Here-Our Options and Alternatives in WHAT LAW
Now FOR THE SEAs? 25-31 (C. Maw ed. 1984).
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not being the only country in the world to stay outside a universal regime
of ocean law.111 Another commentator has described the LOS Conven-
tion as "a major guidepost in the evolution of the law of sea, regardless of
whether or not it comes into force."11 2 Finally, Javier Perez de Cuellar,
Secretary General of the United Nations, stated at the end of the last
meeting of the Convention that "[because] international law is now ir-
revokably transformed, so far as the seas are concerned, we need not wait
for the process of ratification ... to begin."11 3 Thus, it is clear that at
least for some, the LOS Convention is binding, regardless of whether it
is legally in force, because of the strong political influence it has had on
the rules governing the sea. The Convention has gained its stature
through 15 years of negotiations among 117 participating states. More
importantly, the Convention sets out a world-wide set of rules covering
the seas, which reaches the shores of almost every nation.
B. Articles 149 and 303: Geographical Differences
1. Geographic Differences
Included within the comprehensive LOS Convention are two arti-
cles describing the handling of the oceans' OHANs. Articles 149 and
303 apply to different parts of the sea. Article 149, entitled "Archeologi-
cal and Historical Objects," '1 14 falls within the section of the LOS Con-
vention containing provisions regarding "the Area."1" 5 By definition,
article 149 applies exclusively to OHANs found at sea outside national
jurisdictions.
By contrast, article 303, entitled "Archeological and Historical Ob-
jects Found at Sea," '116 falls within the General Provisions section of the
Convention.1 1 7 Section 1 of article 303 applies to property found "at
sea."" 8 Section 2 applies to property found within the Contiguous Zone
(CZ), a portion of the sea not exceeding twenty-four nautical miles from
I 11. Id. at 31. See also Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for American Foreign
Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1006, 1021 (1982). Ratiner believes that Japan, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands will ratify the Convention. Ratiner, supra note
110, at 29.
112. McDorman, supra note 80, at 230.
113. 17 UNCLOS III OR (193d Mtg.) at 134 (1984). See also U.N. PUBLICATIONS, THE
LAW OF THE SEA: THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, at xxvii (1983).
114. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 149.
115. Article I defines the Area as "the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction." Id. art. 1(1).
116. Id. art. 303.
117. Id. arts. 300-04 (General Provisions).
118. Article 303(1) gives States a duty to protect OHANs "found at sea." Id. art. 303(1).
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the low water mark along the coast. 1 9 The geographic area in which
states have rights under article 303 is greater than the territorial sea,
whose breadth is not to exceed twelve miles from the baselines. 20 This
geographic area is, however, less than the area of the continental shelf, as
defined in the LOS Convention. 2' The definition is complicated, but
generally the continental shelf extends 200 miles from the baselines,
22
and the outer limits of the shelf cannot exceed 350 nautical miles. 23 The
contiguous zone covers a portion of the sea which is less than the conti-
nental shelf and more than the territorial sea.
By including both articles 149 and 303, the LOS Convention divides
the sea geographically into two portions to determine property rights to
OHANs. Article 149 applies to international waters. Article 303 applies
to waters over which states have specified rights.
2. Article 149: Archaeological and Historical Objects
Article 149 appears today as it did in the September 1980 "Informal
Text."' 24 This article remained unchanged from the Informal Text,
through the Draft Convention, 125 to the Final Convention.126 Article
149 provides:
All objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the
Area shall be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a
whole, particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of the
State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of
historical and archeological origin.
127
While the Convention defines some terms in article 1,128 material
terms in article 149 are not defined. In addition, the Convention inten-
119. The contiguous zone extends "24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured." Id. art. 33(2). A nautical mile is a unit of length
used in sea and air navigation based on the length of one minute of arc of a great circle and is
equal to 1852 meters or 6076 feet. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 833 (2d College ed.
1982). See infra note 169 for text of article 33.
120. LOS Convention, supra note 15, arts. 3, 4.
121. Id. art. 76. The analysis of how the LOS Convention changes or codifies the custom-
ary international law regarding the continental shelf is outside the scope of this Note. See
generally T. SCHOENBAUM & A. YIANNOPOLOUS, supra note 17, at 50.
122. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 76(1).
123. Id. art. 76(5).
124. U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 3 (1980).
125. 15 UNCLOS OR (Draft Convention) at 172, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.78 (1981).
126. 17 UNCLOS OR at 151, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/122 (1982).
127. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 149.
128. Article 1 defines the "Area," the "Authority," "activities in the Area," "pollution of
the marine environment," and "States Parties." Id. art. 1.
[Vol. 10
The Titanic and the Law of the Sea Convention
tionally kept no records of delegates' deliberations in making specific
changes in the drafts. The chairperson of the drafting committee stated:
In order to ensure that the consideration of drafting changes not
give rise to substantive implications or interpretive records, the Com-
mittee and its organs have followed the practice of avoiding records of
discussions of drafting changes and the reasons therefor.
129
The first problem article 149 raises is defining OHAN, because an
object must be an OHAN in order for article 149 to apply. There are,
however, no discussions in the Official Records of the Convention relat-
ing to the drafters' intentions behind selecting the phrase "archeological
and historical object." Apparently, the drafters originally intended
OHANs to refer to property more than fifty years old.130 The fact that
they later deleted this age requirement raises speculation whether they
felt the requirement was too stringent or whether they believed including
both the phrase "archeological and historical nature" and an age require-
ment was redundant. While it seems most sunken ships would qualify as
129. 15 UNCLOS OR (Report of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee) at 146, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF.62/L.67/Rev.l (1981).
130. Article 149 first appeared as article 20 in the Draft Articles considered by the commit-
tee at its informal meetings in 1974. Article 20 read:
(A) 1. Particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of [the State of
(sic) country of][the State of cultural][the State of historical and archaeological] ori-
gin, all objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the Area shall be
preserved [or disposed of by the Authority for the benefit of the international com-
munity as a whole].
[2. The recovery and disposal of wrecks and their contents more than [fifty]
years old found in the Area shall be subject to regulation by the Authority without
prejudice to the rights of the owner thereof.] or
(B) Omit this provision.
3 UNCLOS OR at 163, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.621 C.I/L.3 (1974).
Thus, the original version of article 149 provided for preservation or disposal of wrecks
more than 50 years old. The second paragraph also appeared in the second version of article
149, as article 19, which read:
1. All objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the Area
shall be preserved or disposed of by the Authority for the benefit of the international
community as a whole, particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of the
State of (sic) country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of histori-
cal and archaelogical origin.
2. The recovery and disposal of wrecks and their contents more that 50 years
old found in the Area shall be subject to regulation by the Authority without preju-
dice to the rights of the owner thereof.
3. Any dispute with regard to a preferential right under paragraph 1 or a right
of ownership under paragraph 2, shall, on the application of either party, be subject
to the procedure for settlement of disputes provided for in this Convention.
4 UNCLOS OR (Informal Single Negotiating Text) at 137, 6 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
WP.8/Part 1 (1975).
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OIANs, the deletion of the time requirement in the final draft and the
lack of any other definition creates uncertainty and compels further con-
sideration of the phrase.
Logically, the determination of whether an object is of an archeo-
logical and historical nature might include factors such as its age, its
state of origin, and its uniqueness. The Titanic appears to satisfy these
considerations. The ship is unique given both its use of watertight com-
partments and its lavish decor. In addition, it is historical because the
ship sank over seventy-three years ago, which makes the ship twenty-
three years older than the drafters' original age requirement for an
OHAN.
Not all objects at the discovered site of a sunken ship may meet the
proposed definitional requirements of an OHAN, however. For example,
underwater photographs of the Titanic show cut glass windows, wine
bottles, chamber pots, mugs, and platters, in addition to parts of the ship
itself."' Some may argue these objects do not fit the definition of
OHANs because they are not old enough to be archeological or histori-
cal. Others may believe that the objects do qualify as OHANs because,
while they are ordinary items, they are or were aboard an extraordinary
vessel.
The second problem apparent in article 149 is that objects consid-
ered OHANs must be "preserved or disposed of."' 3 2 It is interesting that
the drafters allowed for either preservation or disposal because these two
actions seem very different.' 33
"Preserving" connotes delivery from marine peril. Marine peril is
used in salvage law to refer to the danger of destruction from the ele-
ments. 134 Some have argued that OHANs are not in this kind of peril,
because they are well-preserved in the environment of the deep sea.'35
Others feel the marine environment does place these OHANs in peril, as
131. Ballard & Michel, supra note 1, at 709-715.
132. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 149. The first draft of article 149 showed the
disposal language in brackets, suggesting that it might be later deleted. See supra note 130.
133. Article 149 does not provide for a tribunal to decide this issue. The first and second
versions of the provision delegated that power to the "Authority." See supra note 130 (the
Authority is described in articles 156-91, LOS Convention, supra note 15, arts. 156-91, and
defined in article 1, id. art. 1). It is difficult to determine why this language was deleted in later
drafts. But, without the language, there may be disagreement over which tribunals would be
best suited to hear disputes over rights to OHANs.
134. See supra note 41.
135. Ballard believes that the Titanic is very well preserved because it is at great depths,
where it is shielded from the destructive effects of sunlight and algae. Ballard & Michel, supra
note 1, at 696.
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it is defined in salvage law.13 6 But it is possible, in light of the increasing
interest in these objects, that OHANs are in a different kind of peril be-
cause searchers may discover and retrieve them. 37 For example, the Ti-
tanic seems to be in "retrieval" peril because several parties are interested
in the site and one party is interested in raising the Titanic.'38 While
"retrieval" peril is at least as likely as destruction by the elements, and
much more imminent, this was not the type of peril contemplated by
salvage law. It is difficult to know whether it was a type of peril foreseen
by the drafters of the LOS Convention.
The Official Records of the Convention also lack interpretive clues
to the meaning of the term "disposal." The term might refer to the ac-
tion necessary when parts of an OHAN must be harmed or destroyed to
preserve other parts of it. To preserve portions of the Titanic, for exam-
ple, it might be necessary to dispose of other portions. Preservation of
the furniture on board might require disposal or destruction of part of
the hull. Similarly, preservation of the hull's structure might require de-
struction of part of the hull decoration. The term "disposal" could also
be used to advocate for the destruction of parts of an OHAN when it
blocks recovery of other valuable items, such as oil or manganese nod-
ules. The Titanic might be destroyed or disposed of if such resources
were discovered beneath it.
The third interpretive problem in article 149 is the phrase, "the ben-
efit of mankind." '139 The phrase has perhaps the longest history of any
language in the entire Convention and was introduced in the preliminary
sessions in 1967.1' The phrase now appears in several places in the LOS
Convention: the Preamble, 141 article 136,142 and elsewhere.
1 43
136. Treasure Salvors I, supra note 41, at 337; see supra text accompanying note 41.
137. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
138. Id.
139. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 149. One delegate at the resumed eleventh ses-
sion described the language as the "cornerstone" of the Convention. 17 UNCLOS OR (Ple-
nary Meetings) at 128, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/z/1 (1982).
140. Arvid Pardo, former permanent Representative of Malta to the United Nations, intro-
duced the term in the First Committee of the General Assembly before the Convention began.
2 U.N. GAOR (1542d Meeting of the 22nd Session) at 4 (1967). Several delegates thanked
Pardo in their closing remarks for his "imagination and inspiration." 17 UNCLOS OR (192d
Meeting) at 127, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/z/1 (Vol. XVII) (1982). Another delegate thanked
Pardo for his "vision." 17 UNCLOS OR (192d Meeting) at 126, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/z/1
(Vol. XVII) (1982).
141. LOS Convention, supra note 15, Preamble 6. Paragraph 6 of the Opening Statement
includes the statement:
Desiring by this Convention to develop the principles embodied in resolution
2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970 in which the General Assembly of the United
Nations solemnly declared inter alia that the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor and
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The idea may be traced to the concern regarding the philosophy of
mare liberum.'" Mare liberum held that the oceans beyond a belt of
territory were open to all nations.'45 The Conventions chose not to in-
clude the mare liberum language because it realized that in effect mare
liberum allowed only some states to monopolize the sea. 146
The first drafts of article 149 used the phrase "for the benefit of the
international community as a whole" instead of the "benefit of man-
kind." 47 While the Convention intentionally avoided documenting the
the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as its resources,
are the common heritage of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which shall
be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical
location of States....
142. Article 136 states "The Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind."
Id. art. 136.
143. Id. arts. 125(1), entitled "Rights of Access to and from the Sea and Freedom of
Transit"; 155(2), entitled "The Review Conference"; and 311(6) "entitled Relation to Other
Conventions and International Agreements."
144. Larson, supra note 102, at 340 (citing H. GROTIUS, DE JURE PRAEDAE COM-
MENTARiUS 226 (G. Williams trans. 1950)). For a summary of Grotius' theory, see T.
SCHOENBAUM & A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 17, at 10.
145. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
146. 17 UNCLOS OR (Plen. Mtg. of the 11th Session) at 60 U.N. Doc. A.CONF.62/z/1
(Vol. XVII) (1982). Mr. Lusaka, President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, sug-
gested that mare liberum was no longer effective because a few states had, through increased
technology, exclusive access to certain parts of the sea. The President of the Conference also
noted that the concept of the "common heritage of mankind" was a new concept negotiated in
response to technology and that it differed from customary international law and the ideas
behind it. 16 UNCLOS OR (11th Session) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/z/1 (Vol. XVI)
(1982). Those who argue that mare liberum is the same philosophy as the "common heritage
of mankind" have been called the "new pretenders" because they use "common heritage"
language to maintain their exclusive access. Brown, Freedom of the High Seas Versus the
Common Heritage of Mankind: Fundamental Principles in Conflict, 20 SAN DIEGO L.R. 521,
522-23 (1983). They do this by asserting that the seas are free and open to all when, in fact,
only they have the power and technology to reach them. Brown's term may be a misnomer,
because the "common heritage of mankind" states appear to be doing the same thing Britain
did on the advice of John Selden, these states may not be considered "new." See supra notes
28-35 and accompanying text.
147. The third version of article 149 which appeared as article 19, read:
All objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the Area shall be
preserved or disposed of for the benefit of the international community as a whole,
particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of the State or country of ori-
gin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of historical and archaeological origin.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.1/Part 1 (1976).
This document, with parts 3 and 4, were the subject of negotiation during the 4th session.
This version verbatim was first called "Article 149" in the Informal Composite Negotiating
Text of 1977. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10 (1977). It also appeared this way in the first
revision of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text in 1979. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
WP.10/Rev. 1 (1979). It also appeared in the second revision of the Informal Composite
Negotiating Text in 1980 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.2 (1980).
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reasons for changing the language,148 a report of the Drafting Committee
in 1980 shows the Committee recommended changing language in arti-
cles 137, 140, 149, and 153 to read "mankind as a whole."149 This deci-
sion was consistent with the Committee's statement in an earlier report
that an accurate analysis of the text included "ensuring correct and uni-
form usage of the terminology and phrases throughout the negotiating
text."1 0 The Committee also feared that use of different terms when the
same meaning was intended would lead to difficult and mistaken
interpretation. 51
The Drafting Committee's comments about uniform use and mean-
ing of terms creates questions surrounding the phrase "benefit of man-
kind" as it is used in article 149. In the seabed mining provisions the
benefit discussed seems to be primarily economic. The closing remarks
by several representatives focused on using the phrase to eliminate the
disparity between rich and poor states152 and to prevent monopolization
of activities in the Area.15 3 These concerns are echoed by the commenta-
tors who have written on the seabed provisions, and who envision the
language as the foundation of a plan to divide the manganese mined from
the seabed between all nations, both those with and those without the
technology to mine it themselves. 1
The "benefits" to mankind from OHANs may be economic, such as
the funds raised from admission to see OHANs or from selling them to
public or private collections. More likely, however, the benefit will be
primarily intangible. 55 Such benefits might include viewing the objects,
raising and preserving the artifacts, or studying OHANs from an histori-
cal, mechanical, or cultural perspective.
148. See supra note 130.
149. 14 UNCLOS (Report of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee) at 115, U.N. Doe.
A/CONF.62/L.57/Rev. 1 (1980).
150. 13 UNCLOS OR (Report of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee) at 94, U.N.
Doe. A.CONF.62/L.56 (1980). The Committee had the text computerized in its effort to
ensure uniform usage. 14 UNCLOS OR at 114, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.57/Rev.1 (1980).
151. 13 UNCLOS OR (Report of Chairman of the Drafting Committee) at 94-95, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF.62/L.56 (1980).
152. 15 UNCLOS OR (Plen. Mtg.) at 30, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/z/1 (Vol. XV) (1982).
153. On this issue, see generally Arrow, The Proposed Regime for the Unilateral Exploita-
tion of Deep Seabed Mineral Resources by the United States 21 HARv. INt'L L.J. 337 (1980).
154. See supra note 91, and the articles cited therein.
155. For example, the court recognized an award "in specie" was more appropriate than an
award in money where the plaintiff discovered the wreck sites of a 1715 fleet. The court rea-
soned that the item involved was uniquely and intrinsically valuable, stating the item itself
might be awarded because of its indivisibility and uniqueness. Cobb Coin Company, Inc. v.
The Unidentififed, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 F.Supp. 186, 198 (S.D. Fla.
1981).
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If "benefit of mankind" were interpreted to have the same meaning
when applied to OHANs as when applied to seabed mining, the phrase.
would lead to an inappropriate result. The benefits derived from mining,
minerals, or currency are fungible and thus easily divisible. These items
can benefit mankind if they are divided equitably among the states. On
the other hand, the benefits derived from the recovery of OHANs may be
impossible to divide. Because they are of historical and archaelogical
value, OHANs are unique by definition and thus difficult to appraise.
Furthermore, division of OHANs may significantly decrease both their
monetary value and their intangible value.156 For instance, if pieces of
the Titanic are sent to different states, it may be difficult to understand
the ship's faulty structure or its awesome size. Therefore, the mandate
that OHANs must be used to benefit mankind may require that OHANs
be kept intact and that access to them be allowed.
The fourth interpretive problem of article 149 is that it creates
"preferential rights."' 57 This phrase is another which the Drafting Com-
mittee did not discuss in its reports. Accordingly, there are few clues to
its meaning. Preferential rights may include the right to decide what is
the best course of action for the benefit of mankind in a given situation.
For example, those granted preferential rights to the Titanic may be enti-
tled to decide whether the ship should be left as a memorial, brought up
and sold to world buyers, put in a museum, or any combination of these
possibilities. Preferential rights may also entitle the holder to be the pri-
mary beneficiary of the OHANS. Under this theory, preferential rights
may provide the state holding them with the opportunity to carry out
retrieval operations, to conduct scientific experiments, or to receive the
proceeds from admission charged at a museum where retrieved objects
are located. The term "preferential" suggests that the state holding these
rights would even have the option of disposing of OHANs if it felt it was
appropriate to do so.
The treaty does not establish that the state with preferential rights
would have the exclusive power to search for or retrieve an object before
others are allowed the opportunity. It is also unclear whether a state with
preferential rights which decides not to search for or retrieve an object
may stop another state from doing so. For instance, article 149 does not
specify whether a state wanting to leave the Titanic as a memorial on the
bottom of the sea could prevent another from searching for it, or even
156. See supra text accompanying note 136; see also supra note 155.
157. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 149.
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from retrieving it.'
Article 149 gives preferential rights to the "State or country of ori-
gin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of historical and archeo-
logical origin."'5 9 The drafters failed to report their reasons for choosing
these terms. It appears, however, that the drafters intended the rights to
be given to a single state. The first draft of article 149 showed each of
these states in separate brackets.160 Despite one delegation's view that
the Authority should dispose of the OHANs,' 6 ' all of these states were
included in the final Convention. In addition, while it is possible that the
drafters considered granting preferential rights to one, two, or all three of
these states simultaneously, the term "preferential" connotes exclusivity.
Defining the terms used to describe the three different states is diffi-
cult but crucial for interpretation and application of article 149. The
"state of origin" most likely refers to the state where an OHAN was
designed or built. If an OHAN was designed in one state and built in
another, two different states each might argue that it qualifies as the state
of origin and make claims to an OHAN under article 149. The tribunal
would be forced to determine whether one state held preferential rights
which were exclusive, or whether more than one state could share the
rights.
Article 149 fails to provide guidelines for the situation which arises
when an OHAN's state of origin no longer exists. The drafters may have
included the "state of cultural origin" to remedy the situation where the
state of origin is no longer in existence. In that case, the state whose
people descended from those of the state of origin might be successful in
asserting rights to the OHANs. The state with preferential rights may be
the state which has replaced the original state of origin under an "inheri-
tance" theory.
In most, if not all, cases the state of origin and the state of archaeo-
logical and historical origin would be identical. Assuming this were true,
there would be no dispute over the preferential rights. If the state of
cultural origin and the state of archeological and historical origin were
not identical, there probably would be a dispute over who held the pref-
erential rights.'6 2 In that event, ordinarily states would follow the dis-
158. The U.S. House of Representatives apparently wants to leave it on the seabed as a
memorial. See supra note 10.
159. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 149.
160. See supra note 130, which includes the text of the first draft of article 149, referred to
then as article 20.
161. 3 UNCLOS OR at 163, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.3 (1974); see supra note 130.
162. The issues surrounding the handling of disputes are outside the scope of this Note.
See generally supra note 17, and the articles cited therein; see also infra note 163.
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pute procedures provided for in the Convention.163 Because the drafters
deleted a specific reference to the Convention dispute resolution provi-
sions from the first draft of article 149,114 these provisions apparently
have been disapproved for use in connection with that article. The settle-
ment dispute provisions probably would apply, however, to disputes re-
garding OHANs in the geographic region to which article 303 applies
because of the extensive nature of the provisions and the fact that no
specific disapproval was expressed by the drafters.'65
Because the Titanic probably meets the definition of an OHAN, if it
were found in the area governed by article 147,166 the Convention would
mandate that it be used for the "benefit of mankind," with preferential
rights being given to the state of origin. In the case of the Titanic, one
state, probably Britain as the designer and financier of the ship, would be
solely empowered to decide the ship's fate. It is also likely, however, that
the United States and France, because they helped discover the Titanic,
would make claims to it. Canada may also make a claim based on the
location of the ship.16 7 It is also possible that other states would make
claims based solely on the argument that the ship must be used for the
benefit of mankind and that none of the states claiming preferential rights
would act in a way that would foster such a result.
163. Paragraph 3 of the second draft mandated the Authority hear disputes. See supra note
130. Interpretive issues surrounding articles 149 and 303 make settlement dispute portions of
the Convention important. LOS Convention, supra note 15, arts. 186-91, 279-99 and Annex
VI. These procedures are limited to states parties and other groups specifically provided for in
the Convention. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 291. The two main characteristics of the
dispute settlement provisions are a binding solution and a variety of means for reaching it.
States are to settle disputes peacefully in accord with the U.N. Charter. Id. art. 279. Article
33, paragraph 1, of the U.N. Charter reads: "1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of
all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle-
ment, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice." U.N. CHARTER art. 33, reprinted in N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 205 (1969). When settlement is not reached under the U.N. Charter, the
Convention allows for settlement by conciliation and advisory decision. LOS Convention,
supra note 17, Annex V and Annex VI. If no settlement can be reached, several compulsory
procedures are available, including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the ICJ,
an arbitration tribunal, or a special tribunal. Id. art. 287. On the issue of dispute settlement
procedures in general, see Sohn, Problems of Dispute Settlement in E. MILES & J. GAMBLE,
LAW OF THE SEA: CONFERENCE OUTCOMES & PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION 223, 227
(1977).
164. See supra note 130.
165. See supra note 163.
166. See supra note 14 and accompanying text for the location of Titanic.
167. Canada may be included in the negotiations because the Titanic is nearest to her
shore, albeit 500 miles from the coastline.
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3. Article 303: Objects of Historical and Archeological Nature
Found at Sea
Article 303 first appeared in the Draft Convention168 in September
1980. It did not appear in any drafts of the Convention before that time.
Article 303 provides:
1. States have the duty to protect objects of an archaeological
and historical nature found at sea and shall co-operate for this
purpose.
2. In order to control traffic in such objects, the coastal State
may, in applying Article 33,169 presume that their removal from the
sea-bed in the zone referred to in that article without its approval
would result in an infringement within its territory or territorial sea of
the laws and regulations referred to in that article.
3. Nothing in this article affects the rights of identifiable owners,
the law of salvage or other rules of admiralty, or law and practices
with respect to cultural exchanges.
4. This article is without prejuduce to other international agree-
ments and rules of international law regarding the protection of objects
of an archaeological and historical nature.
170
168. The first draft of Article 303 read:
1. States have the duty to protect archaeological objects and objects of histori-
cal origin found at sea, and shall co-operate for this purpose.
2. In order to control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in applying
article 33, presume that their removal from the sea-bed in the area referred to in that
article without the approval of the coastal State would result in an infringement
within its territory or territorial sea of the regulations of the coastal State referred to
in that article.
3. Nothing in this article affects the rights of identifiable owners, the law of
salvage or other rules of admiralty, or laws and practices with respect to cultural
exchanges.
0 UNCLOS OR at 222, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/z.76 (1981).
169. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 33. Article 33 reads:
I. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone,
the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or
territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
Id. art. 33. Article 33 excludes the territorial sea from its definition of the contiguous
zone. The article describes the control states may exercise in their contiguous zones. Id. art.
33. Article 303(2) allows a coastal state to protect certain rights in "applying Article 33." Id.
art. 303.
170. Id. art. 303. This was a slightly different version than the one in the Draft Convention
in 1981, in which paragraph 2 read:
2. In order to control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in applying
Article 33, presume that their removal from the sea-bed in the area referred to in that
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a. Section 1
The first problem section 1 of article 303 creates is interpretation of
the duty imposed on states to "protect" OHANs. Definitional problems
similar to those arising from the article 149 "preserve" language arise
here. 71 In addition, as the situation surrounding the Titanic illustrates,
not all agree on what is adequate protection of a sunken ship or its
cargo. 172 Some believe adequate protection mandates leaving the ship on
the seabed where darkness, cold, and sea water protect it.,73 Others be-
lieve preserving objects requires their removal from the sea environ-
ment.174 This disagreement is similar to the difference in opinion
regarding what constitutes marine peril. 175 Disagreements over the level
of protection desirable or necessary may prevent the cooperation man-
dated by article 303.
The second problem section 1 raises is determining who will be
bound by the duty to protect OHANs. The language of the section ex-
plicitly delegates this duty to states, but the scope of this duty is unclear.
For example, does a state have a duty to protect objects from both citi-
zens and noncitizens? Furthermore, could the language could be inter-
preted to impose a duty on a state's nationals to protect OHANs when
the state itself cannot or will not protect them? For example, it is not
clear whether the Knorr's chief scientist would have a duty to prevent the
United States government or entrepreneurs from raising the Titanic if
such action could potentially harm it. Alternatively, it is possible that an
entrepreneur would have a duty to retrieve the Titanic or parts of it, if he
believed that Ballard's plan to allow it to remain on the sea floor left the
ship in "peril." These different interpretations create potential conflicts
between the state and its nationals.
The final problem in section 1 is determining to which part of the
sea it applies. While section 2 of article 303 refers to OHANs in the
article without the approval of the coastal State would result in an infringment
within its territory or territorial sea of the regulations of the coastal State referred to
in that article.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 3 (1980). Otherwise, article 303 remained un-
changed in the final Convention. For a good summary of the drafting history of article 303,
see Note, supra note 17.
171. See LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 303(1).
172. See supra notes 133-137 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 10.
174. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
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contiguous zone, 1 76 section 1 applies to OHANs "at sea." At first
glance, the "at sea" language appears to overlap with the Area in article
149 and therefore creates confusion whether the rules in article 149 or
the rules in article 303 should apply. However, because article 149 was
drafted in the early sessions, when the delegates focused on the provi-
sions regarding the Area, arguably they intended article 149 to apply
strictly and exclusively to the Area. Accordingly, the rules in article 303
apply to the contiguous zone.
b. Section 2
The first interpretive problem in section 2 is determining what con-
stitutes a violation. The only act section 2 explicitly states will violate
article 303(2) is removal of an OHAN. 7 7 The Convention fails to make
explicit whether other actions that may affect states' rights would violate
the section. For example, taking photographs and films, 178 conducting
research, diving in and around, or transporting other people near an
OHAN may affect other states' rights. 179 Such activities would not vio-
late section 2, however, because they are not technically "removal," even
though they may harm an OHAN in several ways. For example, taking
photographs or films may invite the curious to explore the location of the
OHAN for themselves. Transporting others near the OHANs would dis-
turb the environment and increase the possibility of physical harm
through an accident, equipment failure, or terrorism.
The consequences of violating section 2 are also unclear. The Con-
vention does not state whether returning the OHANs to their rightful
176. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 303(2). Article 33 defines the contiguous zone in
paragraph 2. See supra note 120.
177. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 303(2).
178. Photographs of the Titanic, published in National Geographic Magazine, may abridge
the rights of others because they were published exclusively there and may render other photo-
graphs of the Titanic less valuable. In addition, one might argue that having exclusive posses-
sion of undersea photographs of an OHAN amounts to possession as required by the law of
finds, at least in the abstract. For example, Grimm claims his photograph of the propeller, and
his knowledge of the approximate location of the Titanic before Ballard found it, may be the
basis of a claim to the ship. B. HOFFMAN & I. GRIMM, supra note 3. Such an argument by
itself probably would fail to convince a court to rule in favor of Grimm's position.
179. Ballard's refusal to disclose the location of the ship may also be considered "removal,"
because failure to disclose the location prevents others from removing it. Ballard's failure to
disclose this information may also violate Article 244 of the Convention which states that
those with scientific information must release it. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 244. See
supra note 22 for a discussion of application of the Marine Scientific Research provisions to
OHANs. Ballard could argue that he has shared information with the French research team
and that he is under no obligation (even under the Convention, were it in force) to disclose
such information to those who may only be interested in retrieval for profit, not research.
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state is the only or simply the preferred remedy for removal. The Con-
vention also fails to state whether monetary compensation for the re-
moval would be adequate. Because these objects are always unique and
often one-of-a-kind, money damages would fail to compensate many find-
ers, who would insist on compensation in the form of title to the
OHAN. Is' Awarding title to OHANs is similar to awarding specific per-
formance, rather than money damages, as a remedy for breach of con-
tract for unique goods. Thus, United States courts may be willing to
allow an action in rem for a salvage award consisting of the item itself.1"'
c. Section 3
Section 3 creates by far the most difficult interpretive issues in article
303."82 An important feature of section 3 is the term "identifiable
owner." This term was inserted with the intent of protecting other inter-
national agreements and rules of international law. 183 The drafters' in-
tent to recognize other rules of international law here and in section 4
creates the most important and puzzling questions in interpreting article
303. These references to other bodies of law raise the question of whether
the delegates intended to draft new law regarding OHANs or simply cod-
ify customary international law. They could have codified customary in-
ternational law much more simply and clearly.
Several other articles in the Convention refer to customary interna-
tional law.'8 4 These references to international law limit the provisions
of the Convention. 8 5 One commentator points out that most references
to customary international law which limit the provisions of the Conven-
tion appear in subject areas involving marginal areas of seas off coastal
states in historical geographical areas or historic usage.'8 6 The reference
to international agreements in article 303(4) fits this description because
article 303 applies to OHANs in the CZs off coastal states. 187 The draft-
180. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
181. Id.
182. But see Note, supra note 17. The author believes article 303 is clearer and easier to
apply than article 149.
183. 14 UNCLOS OR (Report of President on Work of the Informal Plenary Meeting of
the Conference on General Provisions) at 128, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.58 (1980).
184. These include articles 60 and 58 regarding exclusive economic zones; articles 2, 7, 21,
39, 19, and 34 regarding the Territorial Sea; and article 138 regarding the Area. For a com-
plete list of articles using this language, see Howard, The Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy, 16 TEX. INT'L L. REV. 321, 339 (1981).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. The continental shelf and territorial sea boundaries are described supra notes 121-124
and accompanying text.
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ers may have included references to international law in articles regard-
ing coastal areas to ensure that the clauses did not supersede law
allowing special rights in the CZ. In this way, these references indicate
the influence the international legal system and the international political
environment have upon one another."' 8
As mentioned above, section 3 recognizes the rights of "identifiable
owners." These identifiable owners might also be called ex-owners. By
recognizing these owners, section 3 creates conflicts between the identifi-
able owner and the finder, who would be awarded title under the custom-
ary international law of finds.I 9 While under the law of finds, the finder
would get title as soon as he or she met the possession plus intent require-
ments, 190 the finder under article 303 would have to surrender title if the
ex-owner came forward and was properly "identified."
Section 3 also states that nothing in it afffects "the law of salvage
and other rules of admiralty." '1 9 1 The law of finds or the in rem salvage
action are the rules of admiralty most likely to be applied in the case of
OHANs because OHANs are usually abandoned.192 By conferring
rights on identifiable owners, the LOS Convention differs from the "law
of salvage and other rules of admiralty"1 3 even though the Convention
explicitly states that it does not affect these preceding bodies of law. 194 A
careful analysis of the Convention shows that it does indeed contradict
itself, unless the reference to "the law of salvage and other rules of admi-
ralty" supercedes the other clauses of article 303. If the reference to "the
law of salvage and other rules of admiralty" supercedes the other clauses
of article 303, the article does not change the law preceding the Conven-
tion in the portion of the sea over which it applies.
Finally, section 3 refers to "laws and practices with respect to cul-
tural exchanges." '1 95 The practice of cultural exchanges apparently refers
to the cultural relationship between any two or three states at any given
time. The likelihood of cooperative decision-making would vary between
any pair or group of nations from decade to decade or year to year, de-
188. Howard, supra note 184, at 338.
189. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
190. Id.
191. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 303(3). The President's report noted that this
language was peculiar to Anglo-Saxon Law and advised that translations should be made to
indicate its peculiar origin. 14 UNCLOS OR (Report of President on Work of the Informal
Plenary Meeting of the Conference on General Provisions) at 129, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
L.58 (1980).
192. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 204-215.
194. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 303(3).
195. Ia1
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pending on the diplomatic relationships maintained at the time. For ex-
ample, under this section the rights to the OHANs on the Titanic and
rights to the ship itself could be determined by negotiations or agreement
between the United States, Britain, France, and perhaps Canada, based
on their willingness to share OHANs. Barring excessive greed, territori-
alism, or terrorism, the likelihood of a cooperative decision-making and
sharing between these countries is much more probable than if countries
hostile to each other were involved.
d. Section 4
The first interpretive problem of article 303(4) is the provision stat-
ing that the article is "[w]ithout prejudice to other international agree-
ments and rules of international law regarding the protection of objects
of an archaeological and historical nature."' 96 Again, the Convention
proceedings explicitly stated that this section was added with the intent
of protecting other international agreements and rules of international
law.'9 7 International agreements would include treaties. There are cur-
rently several international agreements which may apply to OHANs, but
none do so directly. 9 '
196. Id. art. 303(4). It seems fairly certain that the drafters meant international agree-
ments regarding the protection of OHANs, and, separately, rules of international law regard-
ing OHANs. In this Note it is assumed that this sentence is to be read in the disjunctive.
197. 14 UNCLOS OR (Report of President on Work of the Informal Plenary Meeting of
the Conference on General Provisions) at 128, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.58 (1980). The
Convention explicitly addressed other conventions and international agreements. LOS Con-
vention, supra note 15, art. 311. Article 311 states in pertinent part:
2. This Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties
which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention and which do
not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of
their obligations under this Convention.
3. Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or sus-
pending the operation of provisions of this Convention, applicable solely to the rela-
tions between them, provided that such agreements do not relate to a provision
derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and
purpose of this Convention, and provided further that such agreements shall not
affect the application of the basic principles embodied herein, and that the provisions
of such agreements do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights
or the performance of their obligations under this Convention.
4. States Parties intending to conclude an agreement referred to in paragraph 3
shall notify the other States Parties through the depositary of this Convention of
their intention to conclude the agreement and of the modification or suspension for
which it provides.
This article does not affect international agreements expressly permitted or preserved by
other articles of this Convention.
198. The first international agreement is the UNESCO Convention. UNESCO Convention
on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Owner-
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Section 4 also refers to "rules of international law."199 The first
source of international law to which section 4 may refer is export law in
specific countries. United States legislation protecting pre-Columbian
work already is in effect.2"° Mexico revised its antiquities law to impede
exports of archeological works.201 These international agreements, how-
ever, are unlikely to affect directly the outcome of the diposal of OHANs
under the LOS Convention because they apply to a limited number of
parties and to limited types of property.
Section 4 may also be interpreted as referring to the customary in-
ternational law of salvage and finds. This would mean that the result
under article 303 may be identical to the result under the law before the
treaty. As mentioned above, this result contradicts the express statement
in section 3 that nothing in the article affects the law of salvage and other
rules of admiralty.20 2
If the Titanic were found to be located in that portion of the sea over
which article 303 applies, several results are possible. The article might
be applied to give the state in whose CZ the OHAN was sitting the right
to presume that removal would be an infringement. Because section 3
provides that nothing is to affect the rules of salvage or other rules of
admiralty, however, the law of finds may apply to OHANs found there.
If article 303 is limited by rules of customary international law, the LOS
ship of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, U.S.T. , T.I.A.S. No. , 823 U.N.T.S. 231, art. 7,
reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971). The UNESCO Convention prevents museums and similar
institutions from acquiring cultural property illegally imported after the entry into force of the
Convention. Id. art. 7(a). It was the intent of the drafters to discourage the market in stolen
art and promote legitimate exchange through this provision.
The second international agreement regarding OHANs is the European Convention on
the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage. European Convention on the Protection of the
Archaeologial Heritage, May 6, 1969, Europ. T.S. No. 66, 788 U.N.T.S. 227. This treaty
applies to museums and institutions whose acquisition policy is under state control. Because
this convention does not strictly apply to private institutions, however, it is of limited applica-
tion.
The third international agreement is a treaty between the United States and Mexico. Con-
vention of Cooperation with the United Mexican States Providing for Recovery and Return of
Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, United States-Mex-
ico, 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088. This treaty applies only to dealings between Mexico and
the United States. Therefore, the treaty's complex procedure for deciding whether specific
objects qualify as pieces of archeological, historical, or cultural property would not apply to
OHANs in the international framework.
199. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 303(4).
200. Regulation of Importation of Pre-Colombian Monumental or Architectural Sculpture
or Murals, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-95 (1982).
201. Ley Federal Sobre Monumentos y Zonas Arqueologicos, Artisticos, e Historicos (May
6, 1972).
202. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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Convention might not be applied in the case of OHANs found within the
CZ. Instead, the law of salvage and the law of finds may apply. If so, the
rule under article 303 remains finders keepers.
IV. COMPARISON OF ARTICLES 149 AND 303 TO THE
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Articles 149 and 303 differ from the customary international law of
salvage and finds in several important respects: the geographic division of
the sea, the rights given to finders, the rights given to salvors, and the
incentives of the law of salvage and the law of finds.
A. Geographic division
Article 149 deals with OHANs in the Area and article 303 deals
with OHANs in the contiguous zone.20 3 This division has several practi-
cal difficulties: it creates restrictions on searches through invisible guide-
lines, it creates the need to determine the location of the OHAN before
"finding" it, and, for OHANs in the contiguous zone, it may result in a
random vesting of rights in the state within whose CZ the OHAN rests,
without concern for the state for which the OHAN will have value.
This geographic division of the sea is not relevant under the law of
finds and the law of salvage. Under current law, searchers are restricted
only occasionally by the possible legal effect of the object's location.2"
The Convention, on the other hand, may allow a state to enjoin others
from studying, photographing, or retrieving an OHAN, based solely on
its location.
The sea is constantly moving; accordingly, while it is theoretically
possible to draw boundaries on a map of the sea floor, it is difficult for
seekers on an expedition to recognize strict boundaries. Seekers for
OHANs often do not know exactly where objects are located. Under the
law of finds, title to an OHAN vests in a finder who expends time and
money to assert possession over it.20 5 Under the LOS Convention, a
seeker may need to know the location of the object before making a deci-
sion whether to search for or assert rights over it. A finder who would
ordinarily gain title to the OHAN may have to forfeit it simply because
of its location, even if he or she invested a great deal of time and capital.
203. See supra notes 114-123 and accompanying text.
204. The only limitation arises when the property is on the state's continental shelf, which
it seems clearly is the property of the state. This issue was addressed in Treasure Salvors II,
supra note 68, at 1340.
205. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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Dividing the sea into geographic compartments may be appropriate
for some of the seas' retrievables, such as fish, kelp, salt, gold, or manga-
nese nodules, but it is not appropriate for OHANs. The location of an
OHAN is important, not relative to the seabed, but to the state or states
of origin and other states with a particular interest in it. For example,
Britain and its nationals have a historical and financial interest in the
ship because they built and insured it.20 6 The United States and its na-
tionals value the ship and its OHANs0 7 aboard for their historical and
novelty value.20 8 States for whom OHANs may have particular value
should have the first opportunity to own them, rather than those states
the OHANs sit the closest to geographically.
B. Rights of Finders: Article 149 and the Law of Finds
The law of finds and article 149 are similar because they entitle any-
one to search for and find OHANs. The similarity, however, ends there.
Under the law of finds, the finder of OHANs becomes the owner of the
OHAN as soon as he or she asserted possession over it.20 9 Because an
OHAN is almost always considered to be legally abandoned and without
an owner, it is not until the finder discovers, possesses, and claims it, that
he or she becomes the owner.
Under article 149, a finder would have ownership rights only if the
state of origin conceded them. Article 149, therefore, essentially applies
the law of finds, with the following proviso: The finder must defer to the
state of origin. Clearly, article 149 diminishes the rights of the finder
unless that finder coincidentally is the state holding the preferential
rights under the above analysis.
2 10
C. Rights of Salvors: Article 303 and Salvage Law
Philosophically, article 303 is more similar to the law of salvage
than to the law of finds because article 303 imposes a duty on certain
states to protect OHANs found in the contiguous zone.2"1 This "duty" is
analogous to the "duty" to salvage property in marine peril. Therefore,
206. See supra notes 3-4.
207. See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 10, 11. The United States has memorialized the Titanic in songs ("It
Was Sad When that Great Ship Went Down"), movies ("The Unsinkable Molly Brown"), and
games ("Trivial Pursuit"). Since the ship's discovery, model replica sales of the Titanic have
increased in the United States by 500%. USA Today, Sept. 17, 1985, at 1, col. 7.
209. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 157-163 and accompanying text.
211. LOS Convention, supra note 15, arts. 303(1) and (2).
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article 303 and the law of salvage both impose an obligation on parties to
rescue property.
Article 303 is also similar to the law of salvage because it recognizes
"identifiable owners." The law of salvage does not use this term but the
identifiable owner is analogous to the owner in the law of salvage, to
whom the salvor must return the property.212 Article 303 affects the
rights of salvors in the situation where the salvor is a finder looking for
OHANs. It affects these rights because it prevents the salvor from bring-
ing an in rem action and being awarded the OHAN itself as the salvage
award. Article 303 affects the rights of salvors when the salvor is, in fact,
the finder.
Article 303(2) affects salvors' rights by giving states the right to pre-
vent removal of objects within their CZs.213 The salvor's rights thus are
different from what they would be under salvage law because article 303
allows the state in whose contiguous zone the OHAN sits to prevent re-
moval. Under salvage law, the salvor could salvage or remove the object
and be compensated. Under article 303, the coastal state takes on the
role of exclusive salvor with the duty to protect OHANs and the author-
ity to allow or prevent the OHANs' removal. Under the law of salvage, a
party who helps in the recovery of property in marine peril will be com-
pensated proportionately.2 14 Here, however, the coastal state becomes
either a single salvor or an owner, affecting the rights of other would-be
salvors.
Finally, it is possible that article 303 affects the rights of salvors by
its reference to "other rules of admiralty." In doing so, article 303 may
turn the salvor into a finder and actually expand his or her rights by
allowing the salvor to operate under the rules of the law of finds. Alter-
natively, the salvor may still be termed a "salvor" and receive a salvage
award of the OHAN itself. These conflicting effects on the rights of sal-
vors, depending on the reading of article 303, demonstrate the complex-
ity and contradictory nature of the article.
D. Incentives
Articles 149 and 303 are attractive in theory. Neither provision
deals adequately with OHANs such as the Titanic, however, because
neither provides the incentives necessary to encourage action (unless arti-
212. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
213. LOS Convention, supra note 15, art. 303(2).
214. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text for discussion of whether OHANs are
considered in peril.
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cle 303 is interpreted to apply the law of finds to the portion of sea within
its ambit). Article 149 alters the law of finds and attempts to promote
more cooperative behavior in international waters by mandating OHANs
be used for the benefit of mankind while at the same time considering the
interests of several states for whom the OHAN may have particular
value. Similarly, by imposing a duty on coastal states to protect OHANs
and reserving power to treaties and other international bodies of law,
article 303 purports to promote cooperation among states and considera-
tion of multiple interests. In doing so, however, it recognizes too many
bodies of law and parties to be effective.
Each of these articles has made too great a compromise. To pro-
mote cooperation, article 149 has removed the greatest incentive for seek-
ers of OHANs. It has removed the ownership rights, which under the
law of finds vested in the seekers as soon as they achieved intent plus
possession. Instead, under article 149, the finder would be divested of
title, and the state, as determined under the analysis above, would receive
it. Likewise, in order to give rights to coastal states and identifiable own-
ers while still recognizing the law of salvage and the law of finds, article
303 fails to provide salvage law's incentive of the salvage award. If the
salvor were treated as a finder, and if the references to rules of admiralty
and international law were to supersede the Convention provisions, the
salvor would retain the incentive of obtaining title. If, on the other hand,
the salvor were prevented from removing the OHAN by the coastal state,
the salvor would not have the incentive of the salvage award which is
usually paid upon delivery of the property to the owner.
Thus, while articles 149 and 303 may eliminate the acquisitiveness
and secretiveness of the law of finds in favor of more cooperative and
equitable behavior under the law of salvage, neither article provides the
incentive needed to make it economically feasible.
V. PROPOSALS
Article 149 should be amended to require finders of OHANs to give
international notice of their discoveries. If a "state of origin" came for-
ward, it would be required to offer the finder a "salvage" award as com-
pensation for retrieving the OHAN. This amendment would also require
the finder to accept the compensation but return the OHAN to the state.
In addition, the state would be required to deposit the OHAN in an in-
ternational forum where it would benefit mankind; thus, the world would
have access to the OHAN. Under such an amendment, the finder would
be compensated for his or her capital outlays and time, and the OHAN
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would be preserved. This system of compensation probably would be ob-
jectionable to those finders who only want title to the OHAN. The sys-
tem, however, would allow for fair compensation and an incentive for
retrieval while achieving more closely the objectives of the Convention as
reflected in the "benefit of mankind" language and the comments of the
representatives to the Convention.
Article 303 should be amended similarly to require the state where
the OHAN is found or the "identifiable owner" to compensate the sal-
vor. Article 303 should also necessarily require that these states allow
the world access to the OHANs.
An alternative amendment to both articles 149 and 303 would cre-
ate a salvage fund to pay those who search for, find, and retrieve objects
of archeological and historical importance to the world. Without this
kind of fund, or the compensation described above, the "finder" of
OHANs is forced in most circumstances to sell the objects (the photo-
graphs, the information, or the items themselves) to reimburse him or
herself for the huge capital expenditures needed to gain access to the
seabed.
If the international community sincerely wants to protect OHANs
for the benefit of states of varying origins, identifiable owners, or even
"mankind," it must provide the financial incentive needed. For OHANs
both inside and outside national jurisdiction, compensation to finders,
whether by the identifiable owner, the state(s) of origin, or an interna-
tional fund, is necessary to encourage cooperative discovery, retrieval,
and care of OHANs. Otherwise, for OHANs, the rule will continue to
be finders keepers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Articles 149 and 303 of the LOS Convention differ from the custom-
ary international law of salvage and finds. The provisions are lofty in
theory but difficult to interpret and apply. Ambiguities and inconsisten-
cies exist because of undefined terms and concessions to customary inter-
national law.
At first glance, article 149 appears to set out a workable set of rules
for dealing with OHANs in the Area. The article appears to promote
application of the law of finds, but requires a would-be finder to defer to
the state(s) of origin. This deference may be appropriate, in light of the
concern that OHANs be used for the benefit of mankind and somehow
shared. But the article removes the incentive of the law of finds, the
vesting of title in the finder, without providing a replacement. Without a
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replacement incentive, this modification of finds law will deter those with
the ability to search for and recover OHANs from even attempting
recovery.
Article 303 is more complicated. While it states that it does not
affect the customary international law preceding it, article 303 in fact
differs from customary international law in important respects. Under
one theory, article 303 discourages those with the ability to salvage by
giving rights to "identifiable owners" and coastal states. But under an-
other theory, article 303 retains the incentive of title in the law of finds,
by deferring to "other rules of admiralty" which include the law of finds.
Under the latter theory, article 303 simply codifies the law of finds.
In addition, while section 1 of article 303 ostensibly encourages co-
operation, section 2 fails to provide the incentives necessary to truly pro-
mote it. Article 303 lacks the incentive provided by the salvage award,
an integral part of traditional salvage law.
Because Articles 149 and 303 lack the incentive of the law of sal-
vage, courts will be urged to use the law of finds to settle conflicts instead
of seeking interpretation of the Convention, because the law of finds was
the customary international law which most likely would apply to
OANs before the Convention existed. Therefore, the Convention's ar-
ticles directly applicable to OHANs must be amended to be effective. The
amendments must define the Convention's terms more clearly. Further-
more, the LOS Convention must incorporate incentives comparable to
those in the customary international law of salvage if it is to truly protect
OHANs for the benefit of mankind. Otherwise, the ownership of
OHANs discovered while the LOS Convention is in effect will be deter-
mined under the international folly of finders keepers.

